

defined. The possibility of real definitions depends upon things having essences which can be captured in language. The term is to be contrasted with nominal definition. The difference of meaning between the two is a reflection of the differences between Realism (*q.v.*) and Nominalism (*q.v.*).

REALE, MIGUEL.

Q.v. Latin American Philosophy (13).

REALISM.

From the Latin *res* meaning "thing." In philosophy the term has had two major referenes. In the problem of universals (*q.v.*), Realism is set in contrast to Nominalism. In the problem of the independence of the external world, Realism stands in contrast to Idealism.

A. The first of these two usages has had a long history. The course of the dispute, centered in the Middle Ages, is treated under the topic, Universals. Realism is one of the positions in that dispute. In this connection the doctrine of Realism means that universals have a reality of their own, an extra-mental existence. Positions are often marked out, running from moderate to absolute Realism. The more definite, fixed, and eternal the status of the universals, the more absolute is the Realism.

(1) Plato (*q.v.* 1 and Universals 2) is usually thought of as an absolute realist, while Aristotle (*q.v.* 7 and Universals 3) is regarded as a moderate realist. Actually, there is a continuum from the view of Nominalism, i.e., that the universal is only a name, through Conceptualism, i.e., that the universal has existence only in the mind, through moderate and absolute Realism.

(2) In the catalogue below we have not distinguished moderate from absolute realists. After Plato and Aristotle, philosophers who held the view of Realism with respect to universals include: Plotinus (*q.v.* 3 and Universals 4), Porphyry (*q.v.* 1 and Universals 5), St. Augustine (*q.v.* 2 and Universals 6), Boethius (*q.v.* 2 and Universals 7), Erigena (*q.v.* 1 and Universals 8), Avicenna (*q.v.* 4-5 and Universals 9), Anselm (*q.v.* 7 and Universals 10), William of Champeaux (*q.v.* and Universals 12), possibly Abelard (*q.v.* 1-3 and Universals 13), Gilbert de la Porrée (*q.v.* Gilbert of Poitiers and Universals 14), Thomas Aquinas (*q.v.* 5 and Universals 16), possibly Duns Scotus (*q.v.* 6 and Universals 17), John Wycliffe (*q.v.* 1), Hegel (*q.v.* 6 and Universals 31), F. H. Bradley (*q.v.* 4 and Universals 34), Bosanquet (*q.v.* 2 and Universals 34), Blanshard (*q.v.* and Universals 34), Royce (*q.v.* 4-7 and Universals 34), Whitehead (*q.v.* 10 and Universals 36), Russell (*q.v.* 6 and

Universals 37), Moore (*q.v.* 5 and Universals 38), a number of the representatives of the New Realists such as Holt (*q.v.* and Universals 39) and Montague (*q.v.* 1 and Universals 39), and also a number of the Critical Realists, e.g. Santayana (*q.v.* 2-6 and Universals 39). From Hegel to Royce, the above list consists of Idealists and their view of universals. Furthermore, the New Realists and Critical Realists in opposition to the Idealists, introduce a new sense of Realism treated under (B) below.

B. In the more recent controversies over Idealism the term has stood for the view that objects of knowledge exist independently of our awareness. Since objects of knowledge include both things and thoughts, in most modern doctrines of Realism this has amounted to the claim that both things and concepts have a real existence. Where concepts are understood to imply the objectivity of universals—and this has often been the case—the second sense of the term is virtually identical with the first.

(3) Recent decades have witnessed a multiplication of the types of philosophical Realism. Modern science, its initial emphasis on causality and quantitative measure, prepared the way for Representative Realism (*q.v.*). This is the doctrine, quite clearly developed by John Locke (*q.v.* 1-5) that our awareness consists of sense-data of various types which more or less represent the world. For Locke primary qualities, e.g. shapes, represent the world while secondary qualities, e.g., colors, have their basis in the world but do not represent it as such. The view accounts quite adequately for error. We simply misinterpret the sense-data. Since we cannot break out of the circle of sensa, the view does not account so well for truth.

(4) The difficulties of Representative Realism provided at least part of the context leading Berkeley (*q.v.*) to his system of Idealism. One of the 18th-century responses to Berkeley was the Common Sense Realism of Thomas Reid (*q.v.* 1-5). Reid held that the principles of common sense are unquestionably true, and opinions counter to these principles gain their credibility only from the "enchantment of words." These principles relate especially to the existence of the external world, other persons, and questions of this sort.

(5) Idealism (*q.v.*) had its greatest triumph in the 19th century. The neo-Kantian (*q.v.*) response to German Idealism tells part of the story. Certain neo-Kantians, among them Aloys Riehl (*q.v.* 2), referred to themselves as Realists in philosophy.

(6) The early 20th-century movement of New Realism (*q.v.*) initiated the response to

British and American Idealism. This form of Idealism had stressed the internal relation of knowledge to its object. A great many philosophers participated directly or indirectly in the movement of New Realism, including G. E. Moore who in fact revived Reid's Common Sense Realism, James, Russell, and the six American New Realists: Holt, Montague, Perry, Pitkin, Spaulding, and Marvin.

(7) Critical Realism (*q.v.*), in turn, formed in opposition to New Realism. In a sense this completes the circle, since Critical Realism, like Representative Realism, recognizes the triad of act of perception, sense-datum, and thing. The Critical Realists claimed to have overcome the main objections to Representative Realism by beginning with the object, but this seems largely a victory by fiat and the problem of moving from sense-datum to object remains.

(8) An effort to solve the problem by a return at least part way to Idealism was made by E. B. McGilvary (*q.v.*) in his Perspective Realism. McGilvary, who argued for Realism while standing apart from both New and Critical Realism, held that sensation or awareness includes the object from the standpoint of the person sensing. Perspectives, which are something like sets of relations among things, neither exist nor subsist but "intersist." This general approach to the problem was also supported by the Objective Relativism of A. E. Murphy (*q.v.* 1) who discerned in this emphasis a new approach to philosophy.

(9) Lenin (*q.v.* 2) argued for an Epistemological Realism of the most literal sort holding that our mental content must replicate reality outside the mind.

(10) Although both Moore and the Critical Realists claimed to be Common Sense Realists, the most likely heirs to Reid's philosophy are to be found among the Oxford linguistic philosophers who argue for the common-sense view of the world while criticizing the sense-datum theory. Ryle (*q.v.* 3) did so in a general sense, breaking up traditional distinctions, while Austin (*q.v.* 4) worked with special effectiveness against the weaknesses of the sense-datum theory itself.

(11) One must likewise mention the doctrine of Naive Realism (*q.v.*), held by no one, yet widely discussed, that all of the characteristics we sense in objects are truly characteristic of them.

(12) Bergmann (*q.v.* 1) and Chisholm (*q.v.* 3) argue, each in his own way, for Realism against Phenomenalism.

(13) Wilfrid Sellars (*q.v.* 1) gives adherence to a position he calls Scientific Realism.

REALITY.

From the Latin *realitas*, deriving from *res* ("thing"). The term was introduced into philosophy in the 13th century, apparently by Duns Scotus (*q.v.* 1), who used the term as a synonym for "being" (*q.v.*). Indeed, no clear distinction can be drawn between the two terms, nor between these and such terms as "actuality" (*q.v.*) and "existence." Any philosopher's view of "that which is" might be discussed under either "being" or "reality." When a distinction is drawn between what exists and what subsists (*e.g.* possibilities), the terms "actuality" and "existence" are sometimes identified with the former while "being" and "reality" extend over both what exists and what subsists. The following comments have to do with those who did themselves use the term, "reality."

(1) The Indian philosopher, Nagarjuna, (*q.v.* 9) looked upon reality as beyond intellect, the non-dual Absolute in which all distinctions merge.

(2) Campanella (*q.v.* 3) wrote of a graded reality, embodying perfections in different degrees, and all things possessing the "primalties" of knowledge, power, and love.

(3) Kant (*q.v.* 3) defined the real as that which accords with the material conditions of experience.

(4) Fichte (*q.v.* 2) held that reality was posited by the ego.

(5) Peirce (*q.v.* 12) on the other hand defined reality as that which is believed by the community of inquirers at the end of an ideal series of inquiries.

(6) Bradley (*q.v.* 1-2) held reality to be an Absolute which lies behind experience.

(7) Ostwald (*q.v.* 1), approaching the matter from the side of science, interpreted reality as energy rather than matter.

(8) Freud (*q.v.* 7) used the term "reality principle" to refer to that goal of therapy in which the mature individual is able to forgo illusion in favor of reality.

(9) Royce (*q.v.* 7) viewed reality as a "community of interpretation."

(10) Lossky (*q.v.* 1) regarded reality as an organic whole.

(11) Buber (*q.v.* 3) suggested that the approach to reality is through an "I-Thou" relationship.

(12) Romero (*q.v.* 5) views transcendence as the key to reality.

REALS.

Q.v. Herbart (3b).

REASON.

From the Latin *ratio* ("reckoning"); in Greek there are three terms roughly equivalent in meaning; *phronesis* (*q.v.*),